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SAVINGS IN PUBLIC SERVICES AFTER THE CRISIS: A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
OF PUBLIC PREFERENCES IN THE EU27 
Abstract 
Policy responses to the financial crisis can be divided into cyclical and anti-cyclical 
approaches. The former advocates reducing public spending in times of financial constraints. 
The latter approach advocates public spending to boost the economy. Using multinomial 
multilevel analysis on public opinion data from more than 20,000 respondents in the 27 EU 
member countries, we test a model for citizen preferences between reducing spending or 
savings in public services, and investing in measures to boost the economy. We look at 
individual- and country-level determinants of attitudes to savings in public services, and 
concentrate on four groups of explanations: political disaffection, ideology, self-interest, and 
macro-economic conditions. It was found that political disaffection, as well as the 
respondent’s age, education and political orientation have the strongest effects on preferences. 
Macro-economic variables, such as a country’s government deficit level, public debt or public 
expenditure have, surprisingly, no effect on citizens’ financial policy preferences. 
 
Keywords 
Savings, public services, financial crisis, Eurobarometer, public opinion, austerity measures 
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SAVINGS IN PUBLIC SERVICES AFTER THE CRISIS: A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
OF PUBLIC PREFERENCES IN THE EU27 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we explore citizen preferences in 27 EU member countries regarding austerity 
measures, and the role of savings in public services within these austerity measures. More 
specifically, we look at factors that determine how citizens make a choice between a 
reduction in public spending and public investment to boost the economy as preferred 
financial policy preferences to recover from the corrosive effects of the global financial crisis.  
 
Since the eruption of the financial crisis, we have seen a gradual, and in the most recent year 
an exponential growth in research looking into the effects of the financial crisis on public 
services. Various authors have looked into or hypothesised about effects of the crisis on 
centralisation of decision making and coordination, on politicisation (Peters, Pierre & 
Randma-Liiv, 2011), on organisational publicness (Pandey, 2010), on decline and 
organisational life cycles (Bozeman, 2010), or on government responses (Massey, 2011; 
Peters, 2011; Kickert, 2012; Khademian, 2011). Despite austerity, demands for more and 
better services remain as present as ever (Pollitt, 2010). The long-term effects of the crisis on 
public spending remain to be discovered. Yet, Dunsire and Hood (1989) reviewed effects of 
previous cuts in Britain, and found just one instance of a major cut resulting in long term 
reduction in spending. Moore, Baber and Bartlett (2010) talk about a ‘loss aversion’ on the 
part of citizens to explain their reluctance to allow cutbacks in services. Citizens need to make 
tough choices about what they are willing to sacrifice, and what not, and the status quo is 
deemed very attractive, even in adverse economic conditions. Academic research on citizen 
attitudes towards the financial crisis, and government responses to the crisis more 
specifically, is still in its infancy.  
 
In this paper, we use opinion data from the 27 EU countries on public preferences for savings 
in public services vs. public investments in order to boost the economy. We first review the 
literature, develop a theoretical model for empirical testing and then introduce the data from 
27 EU countries. Data is analysed looking at both individual-level and country-level 
variables. We then evaluate our findings, limitations of this study and avenues for further 
research. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed. 
 COCOPS Working Paper No. 8 4 
2. Attitudes to public spending and austerity 
We locate this paper within the wider body of research in Public Administration and political 
science on the (desired) role of government and the preferred size and composition of 
government spending. This literature can roughly be divided into two streams One looks at 
attitudes to government intervention in society and the economy and support for ‘big 
government’; the other looks at generic spending preferences and support for welfare 
spending more specifically. Our hypotheses will be derived from these bodies of research and 
will concentrate on ideology, self-interest, political disaffection and macro-economic factors.  
 
A large part of the literature relates to public preferences regarding the role of government in 
society. As a result of the availability of large multi-country opinion datasets such as the 
World Values Survey or the International Social Survey Programme data, various researchers 
have looked at public attitudes towards the size of government, and why some people are 
supportive of ‘big government’ than others (see e.g., Borre & Scarbrough, 1995; Martin, 
2011). Political left-right ideology or partisan identification has been a common factor in such 
studies. Other scholars, however, have noticed a considerable degree of ambivalence in 
opinions about the preferred role of government (Gainous, Craig & Martinez, 2008).  
 
A substantial number of related studies has asked citizens where they think government 
should spend its money on. This research tradition is especially established with regard to 
welfare spending (Shapiro & Young, 1989; Jacoby, 1994; Confalonieri & Newton, 1995). 
Research on citizens’ spending preferences, both in general and in relation to welfare 
spending is suggesting that attitudes may be influenced by two major factors. The first 
argument emphasizes the role of more general ideological dispositions in shaping citizens’ 
preferences. The other emphasizes elements of self-interest in the formation of attitudes to 
spending. 
 
Both the literature on the scope of government, and that on attitudes to welfare spending 
presume that behind personal ideology lie more general value systems which determine right 
and wrong in terms of the relationship between the state, the individual and other institutions 
(Battaglio & Legge, 2009; 2008; Feldmann & Steenbergen, 2001; Feldmann & Zaller, 1992). 
Numerous studies do support this thesis (Jacoby, 1994; Hasenfeld & Raferty, 1989). Using 
data from a National Election Study in the US, Jacoby (1994), for example, found that 
symbolic politics orientation, such as party identification or liberal-conservative self-
placement, have a strong impact on citizens’ attitudes toward government spending on social 
welfare. Battaglio and Legge (2009; 2008) look at citizen support for electricity and hospital 
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privatization across a set of industrialized countries. They conclude that support for 
privatization reforms can be partially explained by a combination of ideological 
predispositions and underlying values. Right-leaning respondents were more in favour of 
privatization reforms. 
 
Francken (1986) looked into Dutch citizens’ preferences for public spending, and found such 
preferences to be related to political affiliation, in line with earlier work by Lewis (1980; 
1983; Lewis & Jackson, 1985). Yet this relation partly depended on the sector of public 
pending. In one of the few existing studies on attitudes to austerity, Popp and Rudolph (2011) 
found that ideology influences support for an economic recovery plan in an experiment, with 
conservatives being less supportive. Yet, they also found attitudes depended on which 
politician (Bush/Obama) actually proposed the plan. 
 
Related to the ideology argument is citizens’ wider attitude to government. Spending 
preference is then not just influenced by whether people think government should intervene in 
specific issues and areas, but also by whether they actually trust government. Indeed, 
perceived government waste is one of the items normally used in scales to measure political 
trust (Craig, Niemi & Silver, 1990). This means that preference for savings in public services 
may have little to do with (macro)-economic or budgetary considerations, but with wider 
attitudes towards government and its role. This ‘political disaffection’ thesis suggests a 
positive relationship between political distrust and anti-tax sentiment (Rudolph, 2009: 144) – 
if you distrust government, you are more likely to think taxes are too high (Beck & Dye, 
1982). Still, contrary to expectations, Rudolph (2009) found that political trust actually 
increases support for tax cuts (but only among Liberals). He explained this using a trust-as-
heuristic explanation by introducing ideology as an additional variable.  
 
It should be added that while anti-tax attitudes often reflect low trust in government, such 
attitudes are often not absolute. Hadenius, in Swedish research found e.g. that citizens thought 
taxes were too high but they expressed a much more positive attitude to taxes when the 
survey question was built on a trade-off between taxes paid and benefits received (Hadenius, 
1985). In a similar way, Giger demonstrated that, contrary to popular argument, savings and 
retrenchment are not always unpopular (Giger, 2011), and that indeed (welfare state) 
‘retrenchment is a popular policy choice for some voters’, also when they vote for religious or 
liberal parties (Giger & Nelson, 2011) 
 
The other important factor in this regard is self-interest. Ferris (1983) suggests that people 
make a cost-benefit calculation when preferring additional or reduced public expenditure. 
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Extra spending is less burdensome for high income groups; at the same time, he found that 
lower income groups prefer higher public spending in e.g. housing, or that respondents with 
children favour public expenditure in education. Self-interest thus plays a role – when you are 
likely to need or benefit from spending in certain areas, you are more likely to prefer higher 
public spending in this area (Brook, Hall & Preston, 1997). Support for general cuts in social 
spending is relatively low, while there is more support for specific cuts (Roller, 1999). 
Likewise, support for spending on development aid decreases in times of cuts and is replaced 
by local and domestic priorities (Lindstrom & Henson, 2011). 
 
In the literature on welfare spending, the self-interest argument states that those respondents, 
who are (potential) beneficiaries of welfare related services, are more likely to have positive 
attitudes towards the welfare state and related concepts when compared to those who are 
‘better-off’. In a similar vein, Goren (2008) found that attitudes to (US) welfare spending 
were influenced by racial belief and associated beliefs about work ethics. The self-interest 
argument has been widely supported by empirical investigations (Edlund, 1999; Svallfors, 
1997; Groskind, 1994; Hasenfeld & Raferty, 1989). Using ISSP data, Svallfors (1997), for 
example, finds that public attitudes on redistribution are structured by certain patterns, such as 
class differences, within different types of welfare regimes. Age also appears to play a role in 
deciding about spending for certain welfare services (e.g. pensions) (MacManus, 1995). The 
elderly also appear to be less likely to argue for spending cuts when forced to choose between 
raising taxes and cutting spending (MacManus, 1995) 
 
The effects described above may differ across countries, e.g. depending on the government 
system or the general level of (economic) development of a country. Blekesaune and 
Quadagno (2003) for instance found that public support for spending on welfare policies is 
higher in countries where unemployment is high. Likewise, Fraile and Ferrer (1995) found 
that support for unemployment benefit cuts is lower in countries with a high unemployment 
rate. As regards citizen support for hospital privatization, Battaglio and Legge (2008) found 
that within countries where levels of health spending were highest, the support for 
privatization reforms was comparatively low. They argue that when citizens are accustomed 
to public-run hospitals, they become less willing to support their privatization. In terms of 
structural determinants for citizens’ attitudes towards the welfare state, researchers have often 
used institutional characteristics of the welfare state as predictors, however, with mixed 
results (Svallfors, 1997; Edlund, 1999; Gelissen, 2000). Gelissen (2000), for example used an 
extended version of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare regime categorization to predict public 
support for the welfare state, using Eurobarometer data. Although his findings reveal high 
levels of significance, effect directions are counter intuitive. Using ESS data, Kumlin and 
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Svallvors (2007) found that the GINI coefficient for income inequality predicts citizens’ 
attitudes for redistribution, as well as interacts with working-class effects. In contrast, party 
polarization in class politics is of little explanatory power. In this regard, Inglehart (1990) 
assessed attitudes towards classic economic policies of the left, such as welfare policies. He 
found a relationship between a countries’ Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and those 
policies. 
3. Hypotheses 
As we have seen in the review, both sets of literature have generated a number of 
explanations for spending preferences. In our data, therefore, we expect a number of effects. 
One is ideology. We expect citizens who place themselves on the left of the political scale not 
to be not in favour of a reduction of public spending (see also the research by Francken, 
Lewis and Svallfors cited earlier in this paper). We, furthermore, assume that politically right-
leaning respondents will be in favour of a reduction in public spending. It is unclear however 
how they feel about investment in the economy to boost the economy. We expect left-leaning 
respondents to be against a reduction in public spending. Secondly, we expect citizens who 
don’t trust their government (anti-government attitude – political disaffection thesis) to be in 
favour of a reduction in public spending.  
 
Thirdly we expect self-interest to play a role. Vulnerable, lower socio-economic status groups 
are more dependent on government-funded programmes. We therefore expect these groups to 
be against savings. At the same time, however, lower educated groups can be expected to 
consider savings the logical reaction to deficits.  
 
As there are substantial differences between individual attitudes across countries, we also add 
country-level variables. Finally, therefore, we think macro-economic variables have an effect 
on attitudes to a reduction of public spending, or to government measures intended to boost 
the economy. We expect respondents in countries with high public debt, high deficits, and a 
large government outlay, to be in favour of a reduction in public spending, rather than in 
favour of public investment to boost the economy. 
4. Data and method 
In this article we examine individual and country level factors that account for citizens’ 
preferences in response to the crisis. Hence, we utilize multilevel modeling techniques which 
allow us to simultaneously examine the effect of country level and individual level variables 
on an individual level dependent variable – in our case, citizens’ spending preferences in 
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responses to the crisis. The reasons for using multilevel statistics is 1) to be able to use 
context variables that are not available at the individual level; and 2) because attributes of 
respondents within the same countries are correlated with each other. This makes that the 
observations are not independent. Individual respondents are thus nested within country 
groups. 
 
We use data from the Special Eurobarometer 74.1 ‘Europeans and the Crisis’, collected in 
August and September 2010 using CAPI face-to-face interviews in respondents’ homes. A 
total of 26,635 respondents age 15 and above in the EU 27 member countries participated in 
the overall survey. They were selected following a multi-stage, random probability sample 
(standard random route procedure starting at a random starting address within administrative 
regions). At these addresses, a closest birthday rule was used to select respondents at that 
address. Approximately 1,000 people were interviewed in each country (with the exception of 
Germany: 1,600; Cyprus: 500; Luxembourg: 500; Malta: 500; UK: 1,300). After deleting 
cases with item non-response, a total of 23,004 cases were included in the analysis. Non-
responses appeared to be similarly distributed across countries that provide evidence for the 
cross-national validity of our measurements. 
5. Operationalization 
In this section we will first introduce our dependent variable, individual level independent 
variables, and then the country level predictors. 
Dependent variable 
The Eurobarometer survey contains a number of questions on the financial crisis. One is 
particularly relevant for Public Administration research, as it is directly probing for citizens’ 
preferences in response to the crisis:  
 
‘Personally, would you say that to emerge from the crisis rapidly, EU Member 
States should first reduce their public spending or should they first invest in 
measures to boost the economy?’  
 
Answer possibilities were i) first reduce their public spending; ii) first invest in measures to 
boost the economy; iii) both equally (spontaneous). Figure 1 shows the frequencies for all 
countries of the EU-27. It reveals major differences between countries, with more than 70% 
of respondents in Denmark, or Lithuania preferring to invest in measures to boost the 
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economy in response to the crisis, while around 50% of the respondents in Slovakia and 
France, for example, think that it would be preferable to reduce public spending. 
 
Figure 1 Financial policy preferences (N=23.004), percentages 
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What is also apparent in the figure is that in some countries, quite a substantial number of 
respondents have chosen the ‘both’ option, even though this answer was not prompted by the 
interviewer. This has a number of implications for our model because we cannot directly use 
the saving-spending dichotomy as a binomial dependent variable. We, furthermore, assume 
that respondents opting for the both category are not only expressing their mixed preference, 
but also do so because they were not able to derive at a distinct preference for any of the 
given categories (cf. Berinsky, 2005). Hence in a number of cases it may substitute the ‘don’t 
know’ category. Thus the focus of our analysis will be on contrasting preferences for reducing 
public spending with those who prefer investments in the economy as a response to the crisis. 
Moreover, this assumption was also supported when estimating a multilevel ordered logistic 
regression model. A core assumption of the ordered logit regression is the proportional odds 
assumption that assumes similar coefficients across logit equations (Long & Freese, 2006). 
We did run several specifications of our model and all violated this assumption. We therefore 
opted for a multinomial model with three categories in the dependent variable: reduce 
spending (1); both (2); and invest (3). However, the focus of our analysis will be on 
contrasting preferences for ‘reduce spending’ with ‘invest in the economy’. 
Independent variables 
Due to our hierarchical data structure, we distinguish between determinants at the individual 
(respondent) level, and determinants at the country level. 
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Individual level 
At the individual level, we include measures for respondent’s political ideology, political 
disaffection, self-interest (wealth, homeownership, employment status, social-trust), so as a 
range of potential controls such as traditional demographic measures (age, gender), marital 
status, education and place of residence/type of community.  
 
As regards political left-right self-placement people were asked: ‘In political matters people 
talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale?’. The scale 
ranges from 1 (left) to 10 (right). However, since this question typically produces a significant 
amount of missing cases we grouped answer categories in left (1-4 on the scale), middle (5-6 
on the scale), right (7-10 on the scale), and missing (all missing cases). We conceptualize 
political disaffection using a measure which captures the extent of anti-government attitudes 
and thus controls for whether people choose for savings in public services based on this anti-
government attitude rather than based on budgetary or macro-economic considerations. We 
added two variables: 1) ‘trust in parliament’ and 2) ‘trust in government’. Both are measured 
on a ten point Likert scale, and measure indeed an underlying latent construct1. Scores on 
both items were added. A low degree of institutional trust is thought to reflect high levels of 
political disaffection. Wealth is measured using one’s self perceived household situation by 
asking respondents to indicate on a ten point Likert scale to select the position that would best 
describe the situation of their household, ranging from ‘very poor’ to ‘very wealthy’. 
Employment status was coded as ‘1’ when currently unemployed or temporarily not working, 
and ‘0’ for other, and homeownership as ‘1’ when owning an apartment or a house and has 
finished paying for if, and ‘0’ for other. Social or interpersonal trust was measured using a 
mainstream interpersonal trust item (see also Newton, 2001): “Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?”; 
on a 10 point scale ranging from ‘you can’t be too careful’(1) to ‘most people can be trusted 
(10). We use this variable to measure pro-social attitudes in respondents; low pro-social 
attitudes are thought to be reflected in higher self-interested attitudes and a lower desire to 
help others (e.g. through providing welfare services). 
 
As regards age we constructed four age groups: 15-24 years; 25-39 years; 40-54 years; and 55 
years and older. Gender was recoded as 0 = female, and 1 = male. And for educational status, 
we grouped respondents in accordance to their age when they left fulltime education into 
                                                     
1
 Cronbach’s alpha of 0.93 for the entire sample. In individual countries, Cronbach’s alpha scores range 
between 0.96 – 0.81 which provides good evidence for the cross-country validity of our trust 
measurement. 
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three categories: basic education (<15 years), secondary education (16-19years) and higher 
education (>20 years). In order to minimize effects, respondents that were still studying were 
assigned to one of the three categories in correspondence to their age. Community size/place 
of residence registers the type of community the respondent lives in: a rural area or village 
(1); a small or medium size town (2); or a large town (3).  
Country level 
At the group level, we include four macro-economic indicators: government deficit change 
(2006-2010), and change (2006-2010). We use 2006 as baseline as the year before the macro-
economic impacts of the financial crisis start to unfold and computed the developments since 
then by drawing the difference between the years 2006 and 2010. By this we try to take into 
account the dynamic nature of macro-economic effects of the financial crisis on country’s 
states budgets and their economic policy responses. We, furthermore, look at government 
gross debt as % of GDP in 2010, GDP per capita, and total general government expenditure 
as % of GDP in 2010. All country statistics were taken from EUROSTAT. We assume that in 
countries where government debt and deficit changes are very high, demands for a reduction 
of public spending will be more substantial, possibly out of a concern about government debt 
and deficit getting out of hand. In countries where total government expenditure is high, we 
expect citizens to be rather in favour of a reduction of government spending than preferring 
further government expansion through taking measures to boost the economy. Finally, in 
countries where GDP per capita change is low, we expect respondents to be mainly in favour 
of government measures to boost the economy, and thus higher public spending. 
6. Analysis 
We estimate a multinomial multilevel model that allows individual level predictors to have 
different odds ratios on the different outcome categories of our dependent variable. All 
independent variables are grand mean centred, which makes the intercept interpretable as the 
value where an ‘average citizen’ (in terms of the used indicators) would be situated (Hox, 
2010; Luke, 2004). Cases with missing values on any of the variables are deleted prior to the 
analysis. 
 
In a first step of the analysis (model 0), we need to establish how the variance in opinions 
within countries relates to variance between countries, and whether multilevel analysis is 
actually needed. For the baseline model, or the model with intercept only, we find a 
significant chi square, both for category ‘1’ (reduce public spending) (χ2 = 468.29465, df = 
26, p <0.001); and for category ‘2’ (both) (χ2 = 1228.90985, df = 26, p <0.001). This means 
that individual respondents within a single country are more alike than respondents in 
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different countries, and that a multilevel analysis is therefore necessary. We furthermore 
estimate an interclass correlation of 0.042 which shows that 4.2% of the total variance lies at 
level-2. However, this refers to both combinations of our outcome variable, ‘reduce’ vs. 
‘invest’ and ‘both’ vs. ‘invest’. 
 
In a second step (model 1), we add the individual level variables. Table 1 shows the findings. 
Our results are reported as odds ratios, and have to be interpreted in relation to the third 
category of the dependent variable (investing in the economy) that serves as our base 
category. Our main interest here is obviously not so much in the second ‘both’ category 
(reported in the annex), but mainly on contrasting outcome categories ‘reduce public 
spending’ and ‘invest in the economy’. 
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Table 1 Modelling citizens’ preferences: reduce public spending versus invest in measures to boost the economy 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Invest vs. reduce 
Intercept 0.816** 
(0.075) 
0.910 
(0.112) 
0.905 
(0.112) 
0.910 
(0.111) 
0.909 
(0.113) 
0.915 
(0.112) 
IDEOLOGY       
Political left-right identification (Ref: right)       
Left  0.645*** 
(0.045) 
0.644*** 
(0.045) 
0.644*** 
(0.045) 
0.645*** 
(0.045) 
0.644*** 
(0.045) 
Middle  0.783*** 
(0.041) 
0.783*** 
(0.041) 
0.783*** 
(0.041) 
0.783*** 
(0.041) 
0.782*** 
(0.041) 
POLITICAL DISAFFECTION       
Institutional trust  0.969*** 
(0.008) 
0.969*** 
(0.008) 
0.969*** 
(0.008) 
0.969*** 
(0.008) 
0.969*** 
(0.008) 
SELF-INTEREST       
Wealth  0.987 
(0.009) 
0.986 
(0.009) 
0.986 
(0.009) 
0.986 
(0.009) 
0.987 
(0.009) 
Homeownership  0.912** 
(0.035) 
0.912** 
(0.035) 
0.913** 
(0.035) 
0.912** 
(0.035) 
0.910** 
(0.035) 
Unemployment  1.089 
(0.059) 
1.088 
(0.059) 
1.088 
(0.059) 
1.089 
(0.059) 
1.088 
(0.059) 
Social trust  0.989 
(0.007) 
0.989 
(0.007) 
0.989 
(0.007) 
0.989 
(0.007) 
0.989 
(0.007) 
MACRO-ECONOMIC FACTORS       
GDP change (2006-2010)   1.000 
(0.000)       
Government deficit change (2006-2010)   
  
1.017 
(0.011) 
    
Government expenditure (2010)   
    
0.995 
(0.011)   
Government debt (2010)   
      
1.003 
(0.002) 
CONTROLS       
Sex (Ref: female)  1.053 
(0.030) 
1.053 
(0.030) 
1.053 
(0.030) 
1.053 
(0.030) 
1.053 
(0.030) 
Age (Ref: 55+ years)       
15-24 years  0.959 
(0.057) 
0.959 
(0.057) 
0.959 
(0.057) 
0.959 
(0.057) 
0.960 
(0.057) 
25-39 years  0.919 
(0.044) 
0.919 
(0.044) 
0.919 
(0.044) 
0.919 
(0.044) 
0.919 
(0.044) 
40-54 years  0.874** 
(0.040) 
0.874** 
(0.040) 
0.874** 
(0.040) 
0.874** 
(0.040) 
0.874** 
(0.040) 
Education (Ref: High)       
 Low  1.17* 
(0.050) 
1.18* 
(0.050) 
1.17* 
(0.050) 
1.17* 
(0.050) 
1.14* 
(0.050) 
 Medium  1.081* 
(0.036) 
1.082* 
(0.036) 
1.081* 
(0.036) 
1.081* 
(0.036) 
1.080* 
(0.036) 
Marital Status  1.066 
(0.043) 
1.065 
(0.043) 
1.065 
(0.043) 
1.065 
(0.043) 
1.067 
(0.043) 
Community (Ref: Large town)       
 Rural  1.068 
(0.039) 
1.066 
(0.039) 
1.068 
(0.039) 
1.068 
(0.039) 
1.068 
(0.039) 
 Medium or small town  0.955 
(0.039) 
0.954 
(0.039) 
0.955 
(0.039) 
0.955 
(0.039) 
0.956 
(0.039) 
Variance explained at Level-22  4.8% 5.5% 10.3% 2.1% 6.2% 
Intercept variance (SE) 0.145 
(0.042) 
0.138 
(.040) 
0.137 
(0.041) 
0.130 
(0.39) 
0.142 
(0.042) 
0.136 
(0.040) 
Variance Partition Coefficient3 0.042      
Ref= Reference category   
Significance level: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; N = 23,004  
1
 We included one additional category (missing values) in the estimation (not reported in the model) in order to run our analysis 
with as less missing cases as possible.  
2
 Explained between countries variance using Model 0 as reference.  
3
 In multilevel models using a binominal-link function we commonly use 3.29 (the variance of a standard logistic distribution) as 
the variance at the observation level to compute the interclass correlation (Hox, 2010). 
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Results show that, first of all, ideology matters. Those respondents who are regarded as left-
leaning are more likely to prefer investments in measures to boost the economy. Those who 
are right-leaning, in contrast, are more likely to prefer reductions in public spending. These 
effects are statistically significant across all model specifications. As regards political 
disaffection we find that institutional trust has a statistically significant, but negative 
relationship with preferences for reducing public spending. Or in other words, the greater the 
institutional trust of respondents, the more likely that they prefer investments as an 
appropriate policy response to emerge out of the crisis. Looking at our set of predictors for 
self-interest, only homeownership turns statistically significant. It shows that owning a house 
or apartment increases the probability of preferring investments as way out of the crisis. This 
appears to reject the self-interest hypothesis. Wealth, unemployment and social trust exhibited 
no statistical significant effects.  
 
The same holds true for models 2 to 5 where we add country level variables. Since most of 
our predictors are strongly correlated with each other, we examine their potential effects 
individually. However, none of these country variables turn statistically significant. 
Furthermore, their explanatory power in terms of model fit is also rather limited, since they 
have only a very weak effect on reducing the variance of (the mean of) our intercept – in the 
case of model 4 it even increases. When, furthermore, looking at the variance explained by 
the country predictors, only model 3 (deficit change) has a minor effect. It increases explained 
variance at level-2 (when compared to the level-1 predictors only model) by 5.5 percentage 
points. However, given a comparatively low interclass correlation of 0.0042 for the null 
model, this is marginal. All in one we can be confident in claiming that none of our level-2 
variables had a significant effect on the likelihood of respondents’ preferences in response to 
the crisis. Or in other words, the macro-economic environment in a country or the national 
government’s fiscal situation in terms of debt and deficit is very unlikely be related to 
individuals’ preferences for or against public spending as a response to the financial crisis. 
  
As regards control variables, we find that age and education are turning statistically 
significant. Remaining non-significant variables all have the expected preceding signs. More 
specifically, we find people in the age category 40-54, when compared to the elderly, tend to 
prefer investments to boost the economy rather than reducing public spending as the forward 
to get out of the financial crisis. When compared to those who left formal education at a later 
stage, the opposite holds true for lower educated respondents. They rather prefer reductions in 
public spending as a mean to get out of the crisis.  
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In the second part of the analysis, we compared the category ‘both’ to ‘invest’. This analysis 
is only of secondary importance for our purpose, and estimation results are reported in the 
annex. Level-1 variables are statically significant only in the case of age and trust in 
government: Younger respondents are more likely to prefer investments over opting for the 
both category. The same holds true for those respondents with a comparatively high political 
disaffection. In terms of level-2 predictors, again, as also observed for the ‘reduce’ vs. 
‘invest’ analysis, none of our macro-economic variables had a significant impact on the 
likelihood of preferring one of the options over the other. A more detailed discussion on these 
results and their methodological implications is provided in the following section. 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, we explored determinants of public preferences regarding government 
responses to the financial crisis. Citizens were asked whether they preferred cyclical 
(reducing public spending) or anti-cyclical (investing in the economy) policies. We used a 
multinomial multilevel model consisting of individual- and country level variables. We 
looked at four sets of explanations for attitudes to a reduction of public spending: political 
disaffection, ideology, self-interest, and macro-economic conditions. We found that elements 
of political disaffection and ideological predispositions influence opinions on fiscal policies, 
and, surprisingly, that country-level financial indicators are largely non-significant. 
 
The individual level findings appear to mean that a more conservative political and economic 
outlook (as indicated by being older, and being more on the right of the political left-right self 
placement scale) are related to a preference for a reduction in spending, rather than a 
preference for investments to boost the economy. These findings are in line with the literature 
on welfare spending and the role of government on the importance of ideology in attitudes to 
government spending. 
 
Lower trust in government is related to a preference for a reduction in spending. This could be 
interpreted as an expression of political disaffection – a belief that government cannot be 
trusted with the people’s money, or a belief that government is not capable to invest wisely to 
boost the economy (or is not the right institution to take economy-boosting measures). 
Answers to the dependent variable are then not so much a measurement of financial policy 
preferences, but an expression of distrust in government and political disaffection.  
 
The most remarkable finding is that our analysis suggested that differences in preferences are 
partly to be explained at the country-level rather than at the individual level. Yet at the same 
time we find that what we thought to be the most obvious variables – government debt, 
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deficit, GDP change, government expenditure - are not significant and are of very little 
explanatory power. This leaves differences in preferences at country level unexplained.  
Limitations 
One important limitation of this study are the apparent differences in answering across 
countries, probably related to interviewer behaviour or training during the Eurobarometer data 
collection. This is often not acknowledged in other studies using these data, despite the 
observation that the methodological quality of Eurobarometer is inferior to that of e.g. 
European Social Survey or the European Values Survey (Kohler, 2007). As a result of these 
(country?) differences, the number of respondents opting for the ‘both (spontaneous)’ answer 
on the dependent variable differs widely across countries. This creates a number of challenges 
in the analysis. Secondly, item non-response on some variables remains problematic. Yet, at 
the same time we have no evidence of a link with answers to the dependent variable   
 
A further limitation, which is unavoidable when using secondary datasets, is that the items on 
crisis measures were preceded in the survey questionnaire by questions of poverty and social 
services. This may have primed opinions on the financial crisis. However, the battery of 
questions on poverty and social services also lead to the inclusion of measures on socio-
economic status and interpersonal trust in the questionnaire, which would not have been 
available had this Eurobarometer questionnaire focused exclusively on the crisis. 
 
Further research & implications 
The Eurobarometer surveys are conducted for policy purposes. Measurement of concepts is 
generally done using single items instead of scales. Further research into public preferences 
regarding savings and austerity measures will have to develop more detailed measurement 
scales to increase both the (cross-country) validity and reliability of the measurement. The 
dependent variable only measured generic attitudes to savings or public investment. Attitudes 
to savings may differ across policy areas, e.g. in favour of savings in arts and culture, yet not 
in the area of education (see, e.g., Ferris, 1983).  
 
Our main finding is that opinions on preferred policy options to cope with the fiscal crisis are 
not just related to ideology – as expected – but also to levels of institutional trust.  This 
suggests that what is measured may not, in fact, be opinions about fiscal or economic policy, 
but instead wider attitudes towards government and expressions of disaffection. It is therefore 
risky for policy makers to interpret an attitude in favour of a reduction in public spending as 
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an attitude which says exactly this. An indicator which at first sight measures a financial 
policy preference is then in fact no more than an expression of discontent. Further research 
will have to look into the reasons why people exactly use a reduction of spending as their way 
of expressing institutional distrust. 
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Annex 
 
Table 2 Modeling citizens’ preferences: both versus invest in measures to boost the economy 
  Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Invest vs. both 
 
0.362*** 
(0.146) 
0.301*** 
(0.183) 
0.297*** 
(0.183) 
0.301*** 
(0.184) 
0.300*** 
(0.185) 
0.305*** 
(0.179) 
Intercept 
      
  
            
IDEOLOGY 
            
Political left-right identification (Ref: right) 1 
  
0.972 
(0.059) 
0.971 
(0.059) 
0.972 
(0.059) 
0.972 
(0.059) 
0.971 
(0.059) 
 Left 
  
1.042 
(0.056) 
1.042 
(0.056) 
1.042 
(0.056) 
1.042 
(0.056) 
1.042 
(0.056) 
 Middle 
      
  
            
POLITICAL DISAFFECTION 
  
0. 981* 
(0.010) 
0. 980* 
(0.010) 
0. 980* 
(0.010) 
0. 981* 
(0.010) 
0. 981* 
(0.010) 
Institutional trust 
      
  
            
SELF-INTEREST 
  
1.012 
(0.012) 
1.012 
(0.012) 
1.011 
(0.012) 
1.012 
(0.012) 
1.012 
(0.012) 
Wealth 
  
0.935 
(0.044) 
0.935 
(0.044) 
0.936 
(0.044) 
0.935 
(0.044) 
0.933 
(0.044) 
Homeownership 
  
1.098 
(0.075) 
1.098 
(0.075) 
1.097 
(0.075) 
1.098 
(0.075) 
1.098 
(0.075) 
Unemployment 
  
1.009 
(0.009) 
1.009 
(0.009) 
1.009 
(0.009) 
1.009 
(0.009) 
1.009 
(0.009) 
Social trust 
      
  
            
MACRO-ECONOMIC FACTORS 
    
1.000 
(0.000)       
GDP change (2006-2010) 
      
1.015 
(0.022)     
Government deficit change (2006-2010) 
        
0.997 
(0.023) 
  
Government expenditure (2010) 
          
1.008 
(0.004) 
Government debt (2010) 
            
  
            
CONTROLS 
  
1.048 
(0.038) 
1.048 
(0.038) 
1.048 
(0.038) 
1.048 
(0.038) 
1.049 
(0.038) 
Sex (Ref: female) 
            
Age (Ref: 55+ years) 
  
0.787** 
(0.075) 
0.679** 
(0.075) 
0.787** 
(0.075) 
0.787** 
(0.075) 
0.788** 
(0.075) 
15-24 years 
  
0.905 
(0.056) 
0.812 
(0.056) 
0.905 
(0.056) 
0.905 
(0.056) 
0.905 
(0.056) 
25-39 years 
  
0.803*** 
(0.051) 
0.726*** 
(0.051) 
0.802*** 
(0.051) 
0.802*** 
(0.051) 
0.802*** 
(0.051) 
40-54 years 
            
Education (Ref: High) 
  
1.031 
(0.061) 
1.032 
(0.061) 
1.032 
(0.061) 
1.031 
(0.061) 
1.028 
(0.061) 
 Low 
  
1.045 
(0.046) 
1.045 
(0.046) 
1.044 
(0.046) 
1.044 
(0.046) 
1.044 
(0.046) 
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 Medium 
  
1.095 
(0.056) 
1.094 
(0.056) 
1.094 
(0.056) 
1.095 
(0.056) 
1.096 
(0.056) 
Marital Status 
            
Community (Ref: Large town) 
  
1.014 
(0.050) 
1.013 
(0.050) 
1.014 
(0.050) 
1.014 
(0.050) 
1.015 
(0.050) 
 Rural 
  
1.001 
(0.049) 
1.000 
(0.049) 
1.001 
(0.049) 
1.001 
(0.049) 
1.002 
(0.049) 
 Medium or small town 
            
  
  0.01% 0.01% -0.02% -0.03% 7.2% 
Variance explained at Level-22 0.563 
(0.160) 
0.559 
(0.159) 
0.557 
(0.161) 
0.572 
(0.166) 
0.582 
(0.168) 
0.519 
(0.151) 
Intercept variance (SE) 
0.146           
Variance Partition Coefficient3 0.362*** 
(0.146) 
0.301*** 
(0.183) 
0.297*** 
(0.183) 
0.301*** 
(0.184) 
0.300*** 
(0.185) 
0.305*** 
(0.179) 
Ref= Reference category           
Significance level: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; N = 23,004          
1
 We included one additional category (missing values) in the estimation (not reported in the model) in order to run our analysis 
with as less missing cases as possible.  
2
 Explained between countries variance using Model 0 as reference.  
3
 In multilevel models using a binominal-link function we commonly use 3.29 (the variance of a standard logistic distribution) as 
the variance at the observation level to compute the interclass correlation (Hox 2010). 
 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics, individual level predictors (N=23,004) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min, Max 
Sex 0,465 0,499 0, 1 
Age: 15-24 years 0,121 0,326 0, 1 
Age: 25-39 years 0,240 0,427 0, 1 
Age: 40-54 years 0,263 0,440 0, 1 
Age: 55+ years 0,376 0,484 0, 1 
Education: basic 0,183 0,387 0, 1 
Education: secondary 0,477 0,499 0, 1 
Education: higher 0,340 0,474 0, 1 
Wealth 2,809 1,771 1, 10 
Employment status 0,074 0,262 0, 1 
Homeownership 0,513 0,500 0, 1 
Marital status 0,187 0,390 0, 1 
Community: rural 0,358 0,479 0, 1 
Community: medium/small town 0,359 0,480 0, 1 
Community: large town 0,283 0,450 0, 1 
Polit. orientation: left 0,240 0,427 0, 1 
Polit. orientation: middle 0,339 0,474 0, 1 
Polit. orientation: right 0,224 0,417 0, 1 
Polit. orientation: missing 0,197 0,398 0, 1 
Trust in government 4,161 2,320 1, 10 
Social trust 5,043 2,343 1, 10 
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